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like the Agency PE de-linitlon construed by the Fiscal Committee it! their 1929 
report. 
Because of World War 11, the Agency PE definition did not hrther develop for 
a coupl~c of years. The 19-43 Mexico and 1946, Loi~doru Model Conventions 
marked tlrc next step. T'r~esc converltions did not contain an Agency PE 
provision in the actual treaty text. The commentaries nevertheless contained 
cointnents on thc Agency PE: an agent who has the power to conclude contracts 
on behalf of the prancipal shall be deemed to constitulc a Agency PE. Four 
criteria were listed sufficicl~t fol- a foreign enterprise to be deemcd to have am 
Agency PE. An Agency was present if rlre agent: 
( I )  had tlle powcr to bind the enterprise; or 
(2)was an employee of the enterprise; car 
(3)1~raintaitled a stock oS goods; or 
(4) his rent andlor afilce exper~ses were paid by the enterprise. 
The OEEC, predecessor of the OECD, issued a report iilcludi~lg a tmodel 
coi~vention in 1958 which also dealt with [he PE concept. 111 this OEEC Model 
Conve~ztion the Agency PE defi~~itiori is as follows: 
"'A person acting in a Cotrtracting Stare on behalf of an 
cnte~-prisc of the other Contracting State-- other tlrirlr an agent of an 
independent statlils to wlrom paragraph 5 applies- slaall be deemed to be a 
pe~manent estab1ishmeil.t in the first-menliot~cd State if he bas, and 
l~abitually cxercises in thal State, an a~itlloriry to conclude contracis in the 
ltarnc of tlrc entcrprisc, iiuilcss his activities are limited to the purchasc of 
goods or merchandlsc for (he eriare.lprise.'" 
Thc phrase "authoriny to co~~cliade contracts" is based upon the view that am 
Agency I'E sliould be limited to dependent agents oi'those enteiyrises nhich, in 
cicw of Llrc: scupc of tlreis agent's awthorlty or the rratlnrc sf tlicis agent's 
busaness dealings, lake past to n particular extent in businless activities in the- 
other Sti.11~. It was not a gcnesan authority, because thc colnrnittee fclt It u~nlikcly 
that a114 depelldenl agent would have curnpletely unfettered a~rthority to 
corncludc corrtracts. In ihc Sollowilrg decade, tlre 1963 OECD Model copied thc 
QiEEC Agerlcy PE elefinit~our. The QiECD comrncr-rtary delclarcs in para. 15 Lhat 
the Agclrcy PE is slricrly limited to tlrosc agents who are legally and 
cc~nomically ciepclldcnt upon1 the etztcl-prise for which they carry out busitless 
dealings. 
In the 1977 QECD Model .elre Agency PE definition is contaliled in Art. 5, para. 
5, which states: 
""ldotwit.hstandinrg the pmuisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, where a 
persoln- other than an agent of an independent status to whom paragraplr 
6 applies-- is acting on behalf of an enterprise and lzns, atzd habitually 
exercises, in a Contracting Srale an autl~onty lo conclude conlhaets in dne 
name of the enterprise, that ellltelgrise shall lae deemed la have a 
pennane~zt establishment ln  that State in respect of any activities which 
illat person undcrtakcs for thc enterprase, unless llle activities of s ~ x h  
person are lilmted to those menr~oned ln paragraph 4 wluich, if exercised 
through a fjxed place of business, would not nnake this fixed place of 
business a permanent eshablishment under the provisions of that 
paragraph .'" 
In paragraph 31 of the commentary i t  is stated that the enterprise is in fact 
involved in business acltivitles 1n the agelit's state wllen the agent: "has 
sufficient authority to bind tlze enterprise's participation in the business activity 
in thc slate concc~xed." In my view, the phrase ""authority to bind I l~e  
enterprise" refers to a legal connection. The enterprise is bound by contsacl, 
according to civil law, when t lx agent concludes contracts in the name of thc 
enterprise, If that is the case, the enterprise is legally a contract partner 
concerning the cont~acts concluded by its agent. Thc em~lcrprise's quality as 
contract partner can certainly be regarded as the above-mentioned required 
actual involvement in the agent" statee. 
Tlae cwlrervt 1995 OECD Model provision has llrc same Agency 1% prowisiot~ as 
nn the 1977 OECD Model. A11 r~azportant change iru lhc Agency Pit;, concept IS 
instigated by the March 1994 modified colnrnentilry Ota rlic baxjis of thc 
comnletntanes the agent does not ~ieccssarlly have to clatcr into contracts 
literally "'in tlne 11anx o f '  the entergsnse. The pnragt-apl~ equally rupplics to an 
agent who concltrdes clolrrracts w11lcl-r arc b ~ t ~ d ~ t l g  0117 tllc C E I ~ C I - ~ ~ ~ S ~ ,  CYCIY jl' 
those co~ltracts are not actually in tEae nalnc ol'thc cnterpslsc 
11.1.2 'The Independent Agency Clause 
The indcpcndent agency clause (like e.g., the current Art. 5. para. 6 ,  OECD 
Model) orig~nades from English domestic tax law. The 1915 UK Fnnance Act 
contalized a provision wl~iclz exempted certain persons f i o n ~  the Agcncy PE 
status: tlw broker a113 general cummission agent. The reason for t l ~ s  exemption 
was an economical one, thc UK autl-rorities were afraid that the quantity of 
business being done in the City of London by stockbrokers- who bought and 
sold on behalf of foreign entrclprencurs enonnous quanlikles of investments and 
sccunties on the London Stock Exchatlgc- coilllld be diminished because of the 
general Agency PE provision In the Finance Act. Tl~is also applied to the 
commodities business. A broker was essentially an intarmediar?yr acting for both 
parklies through a contract, primarily bringing both parties together. The general 
cornmlssion agent was a commission agent who worked for clients in a manner 
cornnron to brokers, meaning X-se worked for any number of clients. 
Tlre Finance Act 1925 adhered to the same principles embodied in the Finance 
Act I91 5. Section 17, para. J , of the Finance Act 1925, reads: 
"(I) Where sales or transactions are carried out on behalf of a 
non-resident person through a broker iia the ordinary course of his 
business as such, and the broker satisfies thc conditions reqtiired to be 
satisfied far the purpose of this section, hen,  notwithstanding that the 
broker is a person who acts regularly for the nralz-resident person as such 
broker, the non-resident person shall not bc chargeable to il~corne tax in 
the name of that broker in respect of profits or gains arising from those 
sales or transactions." 
Para. 3 of this provision stated that 'Lbrok~rJ' includes "a gencral casrrnnl~ssion 
agent". A new condition was added to the exennptior~ rule: the broker ar  general 
commission agent must act in the ordinary course of their business. 
Later that decade, the 1929 report of the League of Nation's Fiscal Clo~zzmiittee 
also excmpted thc broker ;smell general commission agent Ejrorn the Agency PE 
definlfion. Tlrc broker was excinpted because he merely brings parties together. 
'l'hc coiramission ageiat was exempted because hc acted in his own name for airy 
rzutmher of cl~cnts.' The Fiscal Clornnvlltee did not use thc !term "general 
cumlnissio~l agent" but simply ""commission agent"'. 
Tlze Mexico (1943) and Lolldon (1946) conventions contained a clause 
exempninrg the foreign enuepreneur who had busir~ess deallngs in anotlier state 
through an agent of genuinely independet.11 status like the broker and 
comninissia~z agent. The same arguments were used in the Mexico Model 
Protocol as in the 1929 Fiscal Committee report rbr these exclusions. They 
werc, however, treated as one group: the agent of a genuinely iridependcnt 
status. In my view, this is 11ot correct, the broker merely brings parties together 
1 LOIN, Docunretit C' 5 16 M. 176.1929 11, Ciencva, October 26, p 4. 
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and therefore cannot be considered to be an agent. Tllc %ct that hot11 the 1929 
Fiscal Committee r e p o ~ ~  and illre Mexico and London Model refer to 1 1 1 ~  
commission agent as an agent who acts in his own name for the principal, point 
to a clear civil law interpretation. I12 the Mexico Model the auttrors added lo the 
group of independent agents the abbreviation eitc. (broker, commission agent, 
etc.). This points to the fact that the authors didn't want lo litnit this groivp of 
independent agents merely to brokers and convnlission agents. 
The OEEC 1958 Model Conueslt~on contanaed the followilrg provision: 
'"n enterprise of a Contracting State shall not be deerxed lo 
have a pe~~na~aen t  stablishnlent in the other Contracl~ng State merely 
because it carries on business ita tlaat other State through a broker, general 
colnn~isslon agent or airy other agent of an indlepe~adcnt status. uvhcre 
suclr persons are acting in the ordinary course of tlaeir business." 
This provision is almost the same as the current Art.. 5, para. 6 OECD Model 
provision. While the Mexico Model used "commission agent", Il-re OEEC 
Model reintroduced the term "general comrnisslan agent". Important is the fact 
that this provision, next to the broker and general cornllrvission agend. adds tlzc 
phrase "any orher agent of an independent status'" Later, the 1963 OECD 
Model copied almost exactly the provision of the 1958 OEEC Model, and the 
1977 OECD Model text concerning the independent agent also showed little 
diffesen~ce with its I963 counterpart. 
However, the colnrlsentary of the 1977 OECD Model was fully rewritten. Para. 
36 introduced a two-fold test in ordcr to deter~nine if an agcrrt is 111 h c l  an1 
indlcpcnclent agent. The agent will come lnro the scope ol' Art. 5 ,  para. 6 in tlre 
OECD Model if 
"(a) he i s  independent of thc enterprise botlr legally and econorrrically, 
and 
(b) Ize acts in the ordinary course of his biisirless when acri~lg 011 behal F 01' 
the enterprise." 
In other words: an agent is legally independent if he is not subjected to detailed 
instructiorzs OK comprehensive control by his principal, and an economically 
independent agent is an agent who bears entrep-eneurial risk. In the 1995 
OECD Model provision, the para. 6 treaty text or coenrnentary wasn't altered. 
1 1 2  A COMPARLSOIY BETWEEN GERMANY, THE UK, THE 
US AND THE NETHERLANDS 
11.2.1 Drrmestic Law 
Crerrsiai~ lax law uses the tcrrn s'fdndx'ge Verfreter ("'permanent representative"), 
for an Agency PE, and it colitains a specific article (Art. 13 Abgabeordrquns) 
which dclines thc domestic Agency PE, If the conditions of Art. 13 of ths 
German General Fiscal Law (Abgadeordn~~ng) are met, limited tax liability on 
the basis of Art. 49 of the Gennan Income Tax Act is established. An Agency 
Pb is a (legal) person who: (1)  conducts business for an enterprise, (2) acts 
durably and permanetilly and (3) tnusr cornply with the inslrwcleo~zs of tlie 
principal. 
This Agency PE concept has a broader range than the OECD Model provision. 
If a foreign enlrepl-eneur has a German agent wl-ro I'nuSE cornply with his 
b~isilress i~.aslr~ictions (sacXSic-hc We/.~:dmg~~gehu~?dc~?hei$,, an Agency PE 
(.riBndSge Verfrete~-) is present. This co~ild also apply to an Independent agent. 
Thc .sc~ch/iche Mr'ciszr~~g~rgc~b~~nd~~~~h~id nevert eless rnaplies that the principal 
must actually atid frequently intcrvcize in the agent's activities on behaUf of the 
principal. 
The Agency tJE concept. accorclitlg to Dutch tax law is comparable to the 
Gennan concept. D~~tcla x law uses a Dvltch tenn for pcr~nairerit represe~z~atiwc, 
i ia~i~ely waste vertegen~~oord~ger. T-Iowever, there's one major difference with 
Ihc German Agency PE concept: tllerc is no condin~on which resembles the 
Gcmnan sac./sllcSse Wei,~ungsgebrrncle~sI~eid 'The Netl~erlands basically applies 
their Agency PE rrcnty defjnltian. Both Germany atid the Netherlal~ds seem to 
put mure cmplrasis on the legal aspects cor~cernilig tlre Agelacy PE issue. Does 
 he agent liave the (legal) authorily to conclude contracis In the name of the 
pri~iciplal? The pln.ase "in the name of' ,  as demonstrated irr Cliapler I1, is a 
typical civil law tesrlr whiclr li~nctio~as perfectly In a civil law system. 
Meanwlailc. the UK taxes non-residents if they trade in the WK. The concept of 
a UK rep~rcsentative has been created, wliich laleans "'the branch or agency 
through which the trade is cozrdzlcted': Comparably, the US has a similar 
systerti for laxing non-resident aliens a11dJor foreign coyarations: the US trade 
or business concept. The UK and US Agency PIE domcstic c0ncep.t is- In my 
view- priniarily bascd upon an economic standpaint. It basically doesti3t nvzatter 
in what legal way a foreign corporatioin conducts its US business, if the US 
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activities I-tave such a substance that the activities co~illd be detzr~rrjncd as being 
US trade or business, then US taxation is appropriate. It's relevant to note that 
both the UK and US have a legal system based uprrn common law, and 
accordil~g to it, the leading principle of agency is: ""he who acts through anotller, 
llllmself acts"'". This means that ~t wonWt make any difkrcnce if a foreign 
entrepreneur conducts the US business himselfl or if hts US agent is condirctirrg 
the US busuness. The actions of the agent are assig~red to the princjpal. This 
results 1x1 a purely e c o ~ ~ o n ~ ~ c a l  assessn~eni of the Agency PE concept: is rlrc 
foreign entrepreneur conducttng business in 'the US? 
11 2 . 2  Treaty Application 
All of the countries analysed, by and large, adhere to the QECD view of the 
Agency IPE canccpt. Tlzc only major differcnee is the fact that both the UK and 
US prefer to onlit the term "ina the name ofn' fiom tlie Art. 5, para. 5 IOECD 
Model Agency PE definition. England, li-0111 tl-rc. Inid 90s onwards, eonsequcntly 
uses the following phrasc in the general Agency PE definition: "...anti liabit~rally 
exercises nn a Contracting State the authority to conc1'~ide contracts on behnll'of 
tlre enterprase.. .'Yn coa~-rparison, the 1996 US Model I~acome Tax ccrrzvention 
uses a slightly different tern, namely: '<...and l~abitually excrciscs in a 
Contracting Stale an authority to colaclude contracts that are binding on llae 
enterprisc ..." 
Therefore, the U K  Agenicy PE definition is prompted fiom an econc>mic 
standpoint: as long as the agent is conducting the business of the foreign 
entrepreneur, an Agericy PE is present. This clefirni~t~on gives nnosc weight to the 
cconon~ic substaarce of the business;, instead of ttac Icgal way in wh~ch rlie 
b~~siness is conducted. Jn  my view, this 1s contrary to the US delinrtion, whcre a 
legal concept (binding contracts) is used - ot-re whicl-1 is broadly known an~d 
appl~ed m US legaI practice, and also known i n  other cclrrimon law jur~sdlcl~ons. 
11.3 CONCLUSIONS 
The Ft)undinrg fathers of the Ageilcy I T ,  liule-18100s Gernlan en~~rricipalrttes, used 
a legal concept for the Agency PE. A foreigner- i~oilnd only bc taxed if his 
pemlaneirt agent had tl-rc same legal authority as the foreign entrepreneur 
hi niself" 
2 BowsteaiS on Agency, fiBiE'teentB1 edrtlon by F M.B Reynolds (Swcel & Maxwcll, Lonclon, 
l985). 
The current treaty term "'agent" is therefore one which should primarily be 
interpreted through Iegal inte~rebtican, I19s a legal concept which has its own 
specific meaning, dependent up011 eacli particular legal system, either based on 
a common law or civil law concept. The March 1994 alteratioi~s of para. 32 
OECD commentary refer to a clearer and, perhaps to some extent, broader 
Agcncy PE concept. The Agency PE condition- "co~icluding contracts in the 
name of the enterprisew-- is strictly a civil law concept. The altered OECD 
eornmenta.6y/ points to an Agcncy PE covrcept where an agent concludes 
colatracts which arc legally binding, the lbreign enterprise qualifies as an 
Agency pE. The term "binding contracts" is a concept, which is clear and 
applicable lo both com~noti law and civil law jurisdictions. On this Issue, the 
lcgal delinltjon should be decisive. 
Tlac kgetncy PE defirliltion should therefore be adjusted as Sonlows: 
'WotwitBistmding the provisions of paragraphs 1-3, where a person 
-other than an agent of independent status to whom paragraph 6 applies- 
is aeking on behalf of an enterp~ise, and has, and habitually exercises, in a 
contracting State an authority to conclude contracts binding the 
enterprise, that errlerprise shall be deemed to have a permanent 
establnslamcnt in that State." 
The independent agent could l~ave the authority to concllucie blriding contracts. 
If ihc agent, however. can be considered to be both legally and ecolzornically 
independent arrd can be considered to be acting within the norrnal course of his 
bus~ness, tlie exemption nmle of Artlclc 5, para. 6, OlECD Model. should be 
applacd, and Agcncy PE sfatus is not justilied. 
ISaw agent, eithcr considered to be dependent or independent, does not have the 
authority to conclude binding contracts, the agent can not constitute an Agency 
PE of llrc Ibreign enterprise. Ncvcrtlaeless, in absence of the required authority, 
wcccrrding to Article 5, para. 5, OECD Model, it could still be the case that the 
i4geW eorrcl~ldcs binding contracts, 
Althoug1-1 jscrhaps the hreign enterprise actually signs the contract which is 
negotiated by thc agent, in some jurnsdletioils the agent will be regarded as 
E~aving concluded a contract legally binding the foreign enterprise. The decisiliic 
test in de te~~~l in ing  the Agcncy PE issue slao~tld always be the legal criterion of 
conclilding bi~~dinlig contuacts. Sf an agent oldy has the apltl~ority to negotiate 
coeirracits up to a certain point, the Agency PE status of the agent is justified if 
the agent dtd create a legal binding of the forergn enterprise. A contii-ario, if the 
agelit negotiated a contract, but the appBlcable law does not qua113 the activities 
of the agent as having concJuded a birndirag contract, lslgcrvcy PE status of the 
agent is no8 justified. 
Altlrough the agent perhaps docs nor sign the co~a&act, does not actillally 
corrclude the contract, if the foreign enaerprlse (the prirticipal) can be held 
legally responsible for the business activities of its agent, it could be said that 
the agent binds the prancipal, and therefore Age~icy PE status could be justified. 
The independent agent who works exclusivelqr for one principal is in my view 
not an ~i~dependenr agent. The OECD Model ibl~ll~dates three conditioi~s 
concerning the dependen t  ageizcy status: the agcnt must bc lcgally rx~d 
economically independent and act in the nor111aL coursc of hus Isusirzess. German1 
do~r~cslic tax law ernphasises the extent of control a principal can exercise over 
his agent (surchSiche W~ir.lxngsgebotndenhei4. Although this condition can only 
be fot~nd in German domestic tax legislation, it docs eiqhasise Ilre relationship 
betwccn tlre principal and agent. A principal obviously has [he nght to instruct, 
to some extent, his agent. It is the amount of freedom the agent has when 
opcratlng his business which makes lrim independent or not. This aspect refers 
to thz legal iirdependency condition according to the OECD Model. If a 
princrpal can, and also actually does, interfere wiith the day-to-day bilislness of 
the agent, the agent camot be regarded as independent. 
The eco11omically independent agent is not dependent an one j.>ri~icipal 
concerning his profits or inrcorne. For example, if an agent receives ninety 
percent of his profits from cornmissions received from one single principal, the 
agent is ecoizonnically dependent on this particular principal. An llndepen~dent 
agent could bc considered to be economically independent if he acts on behalf 
of any number of principals or clients. If a principal has an agent who is almost 
fully dependent concenrang the agenl's incollie, the psitlclpal can exercise 
control over the agent, simply because the agent relics for his incorne, too a 
large extent on Lhat principal. The agent" iindcper~dence, ill this citse, is not 
secured. 
The Art. 5, para. 6 OECD tern2 "general coinmission agenlt" rrcfers to a broad 
category of cornrniss~~m agents who generally work fbr any number of clients. 
This implies that the comn~ission agent, who works exclusJIvcly fbr one (or few) 
principal(s), is not a "general" conrmissmon agent witlzin the meaning of para. 6. 
This does rzolt automatically mean tlvatr this agent therefore is an agent according 
to para. 5. If thc exclusive agent does not concllude binding conll~acts- in civnl 
law countries tlvis means concluding contracts in the name of the prineipal- the 
agent does not qualify as a11 Agency FE and rhcrcforc, the principal can 1101 be 
taxed. 
The condraioll tl-rat lindeperldent agents must act witllin the ordinary course of 
heir business must be applted in an objective way. It should be decisive what 
fcliow agents that belong to the same group of agents undertake. 1 would like to 
add to this conclusion hat ,  this coimparison should primarily be limited to 
territories. 1 think i t  us not justified to compare, for example, a Dutch iilsurance 
agent with an ltalian or perhaps eueii an Indian insurance agent. This should be 
obvious because firstly, domestic taxation will determine 1 l  a foreign 
entrepreneur has a domestic Agency PE. Seco~zdly, exanlining the treaty 
provisions ts necessary. Because the agent's state is the source slate, and as the 
slate wants to detlerllli~~e if  an Ageiicy PE is present, comparing groups of agents 
in the agent's sstatc: is a logical approacla. 
In thc independent agency clause, bascd on A12. 5, para. 5 OECD Mooidel, the 
term ""boker"can be omitled. A broker does not conclucle contracts; he merely 
brings parties together. Tlae broker does not meet the gcneral Agency PE 
conditions, according to Art. 5 ,  para. 5 OECD Model. 
In the broadest meaning of nli~c word, electronic commerce is doing business via 
tlae Inatcrnet. I n  chapter IX 1 proved Illat the current Agency PE is not equipped 
to deal with this way of doing of business. Ecorio~~iically the trend is clear; 
using agents of flesh and blood is bccoming mare unnecessary. Cotasumers and 
businesses can obtain goods or services directly via the Intenlet. For example, a 
[rotel or airline ticket can be obtained directly fi-on1 the l~ofel owner or air l i~~e,  
and the travel agent is no longer ncecled- a trend wl~ich is rrreversible. 
Coanr~lanies can save costs ~ l r  they arc no longer dependent upon their worldwide 
saetworlc of agents. 
Tlic ~iao i r~  ssuc  concermng the B~rternct is always Liaw the d~fferer~t S ates can 
obtain their fair share of profits from elect~oxalc colnl~~erce. I think that the 
Agelncy PE concept cannot ofkr  a soliirion to this problem. Because of the fact 
Illat by doing bwsltlcss Ihrough the internet ihc use of agents of flesh and Mood 
bccormcs redutadant, lnd~cates llaat the Agency PE concept uill losc ~inportance. 

Een mmman law vestegenwolardlger hoeft niet perse overeenkarnsten op naam 
wan zijn princlpaal af le sluiten wil hij zijn principaal kunnen binden, een 
vei-i.egenwoordiger bindt zijn principaal als hij als een veflegeirwoordige.s 
handelt. 
113 hoofdstuk 3 staat Duitsland centraal en is bijzondere aandacht besteed aan de 
Izisiorische ontwikkeling van de W. De origirrele gedachte achter dc VV was 
dat het. eigenlijk voor de belastingheffing geen vercchll Tau moeten uitmaken of 
eeir norrderniemmg door de eigenaar zelf wordt geëxploiteerd of dat hij een 
plaatsalcrvarlger aanstelt die dezelfde 'bevoegdheden "neA als de eigenaar zelf, 
er-i daarom de eigenaai- volledig km verwnlzgem?. Duikse natioiiale 
belastingwetgeviiig niaakt ook gebrwik van het VV-concept alleen is de 
nationale definitie van de VV niimer dan die van de VV uit het OESO model 
verdrag. Als een vertegciiwoordiger geliouden is de zakelijke inst-swcties van de 
principaal volledig op te volgen, kan I-iij als een VV wordt aaizgctnerkt, zelfs als 
hij verder voldoet aan alle vlereisten van de oiiafl~ankelijke vertegenwoordiger. 
I-let concept van de onafiairkelnjke vertcgenwaordiger- conform ons huidige art. 
5, lid 6, OESO rnodclverdrag, is ontwikkelld en ontstaiaz-i in her Verenigd 
Koninkrijk (V.K.) erm wordt in hoofdskuk 4 gcanalyseerd. Het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk introduceerde in 1915 anti-ri-iisbruik wetgeving die er toe leidde dat. 
indien buitenlandse onderiieniungeii in het Verenigcl Koilinkrijlk zaken deden 
d.m.v. vertegenwoordigers o~ider vaorwaarden deze oi~dernemingeir in het V.K. 
belastingplichtig werdcn. De drie belangi-ijkste volarvrraarden waren dat er een 
liauwe band moest zijn tussen de buitenlandse oridemerniwg eli haar Engelse 
\i:crlegcnzvucarduger, de buitenlamrdsc ondcmcruiit~g sitibstantiële coiitrole moest 
Iicbbcn over haar Engelse vcrîegenwoardiger cn, ten slollc, er geel1 of miiider 
wiirsierr gcgcrzerecrd wcrdetr dan redc~ijkerwijs verwacht kon worden. 
Orndai he[ gevaar bestond dat door deze wetgeving buitenlandse 
oiiiderncmiizge~i l.iet V.K. z»~ldctl gaan mijden, introduceerde men een 
tniirrci3iiderli1gsbepUliiig voor buitenlandse ondernemingen die zaken dedcm in het 
V.K. via inukelaars, generol C O ~ T V ~ T ~ , S S ~ O I ~  ~ge~111~ of andere niet-bevoegde 
vcrtcgenwooi-dlgcrs. I landel via deze groep 6 'o~iaf~~ankeli~~kcyn 
verlcgcnwoordigers leidde niet tot belastingplicht imi liet V.K. De geueml 
caontmi,~sio/.s ~ge1i7~ mias een vertegenwoordiger- die op commissiebasis voor 
klairten werkte en1 zij11 activiteiten niet beperkte tot &&n principaal af een geringe 
groep prirlcipale~a. In 1925 werden de voonvaanden voor de onafl~ankelijke 
vertegenwoordiger verder ttitgebrcid. De liuidige volai~vaarde dat onafhankelijke 
vertegenwnoi.digcrs i~zoeten handelcn in de norniale uitoefenii~g van h m  Ibcdrjjf 
MI~SCI  toet1 geïnmncltnceerd. 

1n een uitspraak van de Hoge Raad van 28 ~ ~ ~ 1 1 1  995 (BNB 1996i108c) inzake 
een Engelsc verzekeraar. verwierp dc Hoge Raad het stalidpunt van hen 
Ministcrtc van F~ncunciën dat indgen een Nederlai~dse vertegenwoordiger voor 
een  buitesi1,aridse onderneming verschillende activiteiten verricht, een splitsirig 
in. dezx activiteiten kan worden aai~gebracht. zodanig dat voor bepaalde 
activiteiten deze verlegenwoordiger als een W kan worden beschouwd ei1 voor 
andere activiteiten niet (onrdat m.b.t. deze activrteiren de veriegenzvoordiger als 
ccn onakankel~jke vertegenwoordiger kan worden aangemerkt). Hel betrof hier, 
voor de dwiideldk, allcmaal activiteuten voer een en dezelfde onderncmnng. De 
Hoge Ra~td bepaalde dat in een dergeluk geval er een1 totale beoordeliiig moei 
worden geinaalct die er toe kan Iciden dal de vertegenwoordager of als een VV 
wordt aangemerkt o i  als een onahlrankelijke vertegenwoordiger. 
In I~oofdszuk 7 wordt de historische ontwikkeling van de vast 
vertcgcnwoordiger besproken vanmaf de Volkenbond rapportages in de tuilntiiger 
jaren toa ei1 met Izct huidige OESO rrrodelvcrdrag. In het Volkenbol~d rapport uit 
1929 kwam o.a. naar voren dat een l~iakelaar gcen VV kan zolil aangezien een 
makelaar alle ei^ iliaar partijen bd elkaar brengt, een makelaar is geen 
vertcgenwoordigcr. Een n.1n.m. juridische intcrpretatne die juist is. De term 
general cosnmissiovr cgsnl is in 1ie.î Volkcnbom~d rapport uit 1929 in het Frans 
vertaald als rornir7lrssru1.~nfre. Dczc vertaling is oijuist, aangezien eeil Franse 
civil law cocrimissionani een andere vertegenwoordiger is dan ceil coannilon law 
g ~ ~ ~ e i . n l  cor~~dmissio/7 a g e ~ t .  Sincis 1929 wordt deze laatste teni-i consequent in 
het Wcderlands vertaald als comii~issiom-bair, een vertaling die niet junst is. 
Op groild van een rapport uit 1958 van de internatiobtiale kamers van koophandel 
is in am-t. 5 ,  lid 6, vaal het OI?SO rnodclverdrag dc voorwaarde opgcnoi~iel~ dat de 
onatl-i;.ankelijkc vcricgenwoordigers moeteil J~airdelen: rn de normale uitoefe~i~rlg 
va11 huil bcdrij il:
In hel (IESG) iiicadclverdrag uil 1963 werd in liet cominentaar [,oor het eerst 
ver\wcsen naar een belangrijk clement vai-i dc VV definitie. i~arnclíjk dar de 
vcrtegcnwoordigcr contracten moet afsluiten die dc princapaal binden. 
111 lioolastiuk X wordt de huidige interpretatie van hec. VV concept geanalyseerd. 
Pritl~nir is er sprake van een jzmridisch concept, aamelijk het 
vcrtegenwooi.digi11gs1ecrs~k. De aloom?narde dat een vertegenwoordiger dc 
ilicvoegdlicid n ~ o c ~  E-aebbeir olm overecnkoinsteru af te sluiterr op ilartin van de 
priilclpaal hecA alleen betekenis in civil law jurisdicties. Dat in het OESO 
cominenkaar wordt bepaald dat ook ve~+tegen~voordigers; die geen 
overec~~koii~stcaa Iettcrl~jk op naai11 van de principaal afsluiten, maar wel 
overeenkomsten afsluiten die de principaal bindeir, duidt op een juridnsche 
iilterpretatie. Zo moet het n.m.m. ook worden uitgelegd; er moel sprake zi-jti \:al1 
een juridische binding, de wertegeriwoordigcr moet een aansprakelljMicid 
vestigen voor zijn principaal. 
EH is nog steeds belloefte aan een uitzondeHingsbe~7a1iiag ex. art.5, lid 6. OESO 
modelverdrag. De makelaar kan n.m.m. uit dit artikel ~wordeii weggelateil 
aangezien de makelaar geen contracten afsluit, alleen partijen bij elkaar brerlgt. 
Een onafh?ankeli_ike vertegenwoordiger vnrniit: geei? VV voor zij11 pcillcilpaal 
zelfs al zou hij bindende contracten op naam van de principaal afsl~iiienl. Eer1 
onafhankelijke vertegenwoordiger is onafl~minkelijk, i i ~  ziil van lid 6, als lri.1 
zowel juridisch als economisch onafliankelijk is en handelt in zijn norinale 
bedsij fsulfoefening. 
De praktische toepassiiagen wan licr VV concept vvordet-i besproken in hoofdstuk 
9. Een belangrijke praktische toepéissii~g is de commissionzairsr*r~tchi.ur. I-let gaat 
hier o111 een distributiestnicluvr. Als een oirdei~aenning haar prodticten vla een 
cotnimissioriair doorverkoopt, is er iia.1n.m. geen sprake van een 'lil! inldieil deze 
cor~imiissionair voldoet aan alle vereisten van de onaihailkelgke 
vertegenwoord~ger, confaml afl.5, lid 6, OESO n~~odclverclrcug. 
Een exclusieve connmissianair, d.w.z. een c o ~ ~ ~ r n i s s i o ~ ~ u i r  die (vrijwel] exclusief 
voor Cèii principaal werkt, is geel1 g~ner-d ccsmmixrioj.r agent (cf. lid 6) en zal, 
indien hij bindende contracten afsluit voor zijn prmcipaal, cen VV voor zijn 
pn-irrcipaal kunnen voriilen. Toets i~~g van de excliusicve cornmissioruair ailil art.5, 
lid 5, OESO nlodelverdrag is dan geboden. 
Het VV concept speelt gceri rol van betekenis inzake e-commerce. Vanwege het 
feit dat liet VV concept gebaseerd us ap een persoon van vlees en bloed, de 
vertegcii~woordiger, die contracten voor z ~ j n  prmeipaal afsluit, is dit coiiecpt lalct 
berekend op llandel via intemct. 
Als er sprake is van cen VV is dc vervolgvraag hoeveel winst aai? de VV inoet 
worden gealloceerd. Deze vraag staal cci~ti.aal in lioofdsileik 10. Volgens de 
dircctc methode moet de vasilc ve~egeiawoordiger worden belaandcld alsof deze 
eeii onaflrarikelijke cterde parltlj 1s. Een fictie die niet atrookt inet het feit dal de 
vaste vel-tegenwoordiger onderdeel uatmsrakh van de ondcritemiïig van de 
principaal. Basis voor de winstallocatic vati de VV is de cot-rtmnissie die deze 
ontvangt voor zujn wcrkzaamhedcri. Dcze cominissiie za1 een murktctai~fon~rc 
coinmnscie moeten zijn. Om deze te bepalen zal ccni vergelij~king inoeteil wordcru 
gemaakt met een ~nafhankeli jk~ vericgcnwoordiger die vcrgelijkbarc 
activiteiten verricht. Na aftrek van de directe werkoopkosteii kan een deel van dc 
winst aan de UV-staat worden geallaceerd. 
Ik concludeer (hoofdstuk 1 1) dat de term veflegenwoordigcr uit het W artikel 
eera. juridisch begrip is ei1 als zodanig gefnterpreteerd dient te worden. Vanwege 
het feit dat het begrip vertegenwoordiger in belastingverdragen niet nader wordt 
gedefinieerd, zal natioiqale wetgeving de definitieve invulling c.q. definitae 
moeten bepalen. Het maakt daarom verschil uit of er sprake is van een commom 
law of ciuil law jurisdictie. 
Ben onafhankelijke vcrtegenwoosdiger is onaRnankelijk als hij zowel juridisch 
allas econiarnicch onafhankelijk is en handelt in zijn normale bedirfifsuitoefenin%. 
Als de onaí%arikel(jke vertegenwoordiger conikacten afsluit die zijn principaal 
binden zal hij op grond van dit feit: geen W vormen indien hij verder aan de 
vereistcn van de oilafI?azikelijke vertegenwoordiger (cf. art. 5, lid 4, OESO1 
nnladelverdrag) voldoet. 
Bij beoordeling van de vraag of de weifegenwoordiger die alleen contracten 
onderl~andelt en niet feitellijk afsluit een VV kan vormen, is n.m.m. 
doorslaggevend oC de vertegenwoordiger zijn principaal bindt. Dit zal een 
juridische aalalyse inhouden gebaseerd op de civiele wetgeving (priiar or 
cerrtrtrct !@w) van de verdragslultei~de staten, 
